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1 Introduction
The importance of agricultural productivity growth for industrialization has long been rec-
ognized by economists. For example, Nurkse (1953) stated that “[e]veryone knows that the
spectacular industrial revolution would not have been possible without the agricultural rev-
olution that preceded it.” Rostow (1960) argued that “revolutionary changes in agricultural
productivity are an essential condition for successful take-o.”
There are many theoretical studies on this issue. In particular, Matsuyama (1992) is a
celebrated study that examines how an increase in agricultural productivity aects industri-
alization by using a two-sector growth model.1) He shows that an increase in agricultural
productivity does not lead to industrialization in a small open economy because it promotes
a comparative advantage in agriculture at the expense of manufacturing. In addition, he
shows that if a developing country under free trade cannot industrialize, then the country
begins to specialize in agriculture, and consequently, has a lower growth rate. He uses the
Stone-Geary utility function of non-homothetic preferences, which implies that the income
elasticity of demand for agricultural goods is less than unity. The engine of growth of the
Matsuyama model is driven by learning by doing in the manufacturing sector.
Chang et al. (2006) investigate the relationship between public provision of infrastructure
based on Barro (1990) and industrialization. They introduce the provision of infrastructure
into Matsuyama’s (1992) model, and show that an increase in the public provision of infras-
tructure promotes a comparative advantage in manufacturing and an increase in agricultural
productivity can promote industrialization.
Despite these attractive results, Chang et al. (2006) have the following two problems.
First, their model assumes that infrastructures are automatically produced by tax revenues:
no production factor is used for production of infrastructures. Hence, they do not consider
the trade-o of labor between sectors: an increase in workers in the public sector decreases
workers in the agricultural and manufacturing sectors. Second, they focus their attention
on the analysis of the GDP growth rate. Therefore, they do not explicitly consider the
relationship between the tax rate and welfare.
In this paper, we extend Chang et al. (2006) to a model that the government employs
workers in the public sector and the their wages are financed by the tax revenue. In addition,
our model derives the total welfare and investigates the relationship between tax rates and
the total welfare.
1) Lewis (1954) is the forerunner of two-sector models of industrialization in developing counties. For
extensions of the Lewis model, see also Kirkpatrick and Barrientos (2004), Temple (2005), and Wang and
Piesse (2013). Wong and Yip (1999) incorporate capital accumulation into the two-sector trade model of
Matsuyama (1992).
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Moreover, our model considers the concept of dynamic comparative advantage proposed
by Redding (1999). In his model, it is assumed that the home country does not initially have
a comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector. Therefore, if the home country en-
gages in free trade at the initial time, then it specializes in the agricultural sector. However,
it is assumed that the learning potential, that is, the eciency of learning by doing in the
manufacturing sector of the home country, is higher than that of the foreign country. Hence,
if the home country continues to be an autarkic economy until it has a comparative ad-
vantage in the manufacturing sector, it will eventually be able to industrialize. This type
of endogenous comparative advantage is called as “dynamic comparative advantage.” Note
that Matsuyama (1992) and Chang et al. (2006) do not directly address dynamic comparative
advantage.2)
Redding (1999) suggests that an increase in agricultural productivity would not promote
a dynamic comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector because he assumes the Cobb-
Douglas utility function of homothetic preference. He shows that a country can obtain a
dynamic comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector as long as it has a high learning
potential in the manufacturing sector. However, we believe that this is only applicable to a
small number of developing countries that have a growth potential from the beginning.
Wong and Yip (2010) construct a two-sector small open economy model, which is sim-
ilar to the model of Chang et al. (2006). They discuss the dynamic comparative advantage
in the manufacturing sector as Redding (1999). Their model assumes that the lump-sum tax
and the manufacturing sector subsidy attract labor from the agricultural sector to the manu-
facturing sector. In addition, they show that there is a tax rate maximizing the welfare during
the autarkic period. In contrast, if the country can specialize in the manufacturing sector,
then the government stops subsidizing.
In this paper, we compare the welfare under specialization in the agricultural sector with
the welfare under specialization in the manufacturing sector from some point in time. In
our model, the home country has a comparative advantage in the agricultural sector at initial
time. However, if the home country delays engaging in trade until it has a comparative
advantage in the manufacturing sector, it can industrialize and obtain a higher welfare. In
addition, we investigate the eect of an increase in agricultural productivity on the total
welfare and the timing of opening trade.
The results of our analysis are summarized as follows. (1) There is an optimal tax rate
maximizing the total welfare. (2) If basic consumption is positive, that is, the preference
is non-homothetic, then an increase in agricultural productivity can accelerate the timing of
2) The model of Ortiz (2004) is similar to that of Chang et al. (2006). He incorporates productive public
expenditure based on the work of Barro (1990) into a two-sector small open economy model of Matsuyama
(1992). However, he also does not investigate the dynamic comparative advantage a` la Redding (1999).
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opening trade. In addition, we show that the acceleration of the timing of opening trade does
not necessarily improve the total welfare. (3) If there is no basic consumption, that is, the
preference is homothetic, then an increase in agricultural productivity delays the timing of
opening trade and necessarily decreases the total welfare. (4) An increase in the eciency
of the public sector accelerates the timing of opening trade irrespective of the existence of
basic consumption. (5) At the very timing of opening trade, the instantaneous utility under
industrialization is lower than that under specialization in agriculture. However, the growth
rate of the instantaneous utility under industrialization is higher than that under specializa-
tion in agriculture. Hence, depending on conditions, the total welfare under industrialization
can be higher than that under specialization in agriculture.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains our model and in-
vestigates it under autarky. Section 3 investigates the model under a small open economy
and obtains the timing of opening trade. Section 4, by using both analytical and numerical
methods, shows the existence of optimal tax rates maximizing the total welfare and inves-
tigates the relationship between agricultural productivity and welfare. Section 5 concludes
the paper.
2 Model
2.1 Production
In the home country (Home, hereafter), there are two sectors: the agricultural sector (a) and
the manufacture sector (m). Labor is the only production factor and total labor endowment
is normalized to unity, L (= 1). We neglect population growth and migration. We assume
that labor is perfectly mobile between the two sectors and hence, wage wt is identical across
the two sectors. We specify production functions as follows:
Xmt = MtLmt; (1)
Xat = ALat: (2)
where Xit denotes the total output in sector i (= a;m) at time t, A is the agricultural produc-
tivity and a constant parameter, and Mt is the manufacturing productivity.3)
Through learning by doing and investment in infrastructures, the manufacturing produc-
tivity Mt continues to increase through time. Let Gt denote the quantity of infrastructures
3) The linear production functions in equations (1) and (2) are dierent from those used in Matsuyama
(1992). This dierence does not aect results of our study so much.
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provided by the government.4) Furthermore, the government must employ labor to supply
infrastructures. Following Chang et al. (2006), we specify the growth rate of manufacturing
productivity as follows:
M˙t = GtXmt =) M˙tMt = GtLmt: (3)
The infrastructure production function is defined as follows:
Gt = Lg; (4)
where  > 0 is the eciency parameter in the public sector and Lg is the number of workers
employed in the public sector.5)
We assume that the government imposes the same production tax rate  (> 0) on both
sectors. This setting of the production tax rate follows Ortiz (2004) and Chang et al. (2006).
Thus, the revenue of the government is given by
(PtXmt + Xat) = wt; (5)
where Pt is the relative price of manufactured goods in terms of agricultural goods. Fur-
thermore, from equation (5), the government uses the tax revenue to pay wages for public
workers.
wtLg = wt () Lg = : (6)
Accordingly, workers in the public sector are constant through time. From equations (4) and
(6), we obtain G = .
The labor market clearing condition is given by
Lat + Lmt + Lg = 1: (7)
The profit of each sector is as follows:
mt = Pt(1   )Xmt   wtLmt; (8)
at = (1   )Xat   wtLat: (9)
4) We can consider infrastructures as scientific research, transportation system, education, and so forth.
5) This specification is similar to the specification used in Sasaki (2008), who considers a skill producing
sector and assumes that the acquisition of skills requires labor. His skill producing sector is similar to infras-
tructures in our model.
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From equations (8) and (9), we derive the profit maximization conditions and rewrite them
as follows:
Pt =
wt
(1   )Mt ; (10)
1 =
wt
(1   )A : (11)
Hence, the wage is given by w = (1   )A if both goods are produced. From equations (10)
and (11), the relative price is given by Pt = A=Mt. Thus, if the manufacturing productivity
increases, then the relative price decreases.
2.2 Consumer behavior
Let us assume that consumers obtain utility from the consumption of manufactured and agri-
cultural goods. All consumers in the Home share identical preferences. We adopt the Stone-
Geary utility function of non-homothetic preference.6) The utility maximization problem is
given by
max
cat ;cmt
W =
Z 1
0
ute t dt where ut =  ln(cat   ) + ln cmt; (12)
s:t: cat + Ptcmt = wt; (13)
where  > 0 denotes the subsistence level of agricultural consumption,  > 0 is the constant
discount rate, cit is the per capita consumption of good i (= a;m), and  > 0 is the preference
parameter. In addition, cat must satisfy the condition cat > , that is, the consumption of
agricultural goods exceeds the subsistence level.
Solving the above utility maximization problem, we obtain the aggregated utility maxi-
mizing condition as follows:
Cat =  + PtCmt; (14)
where Cat and Cmt denote the aggregated consumption of agricultural goods and that of
manufactured goods, respectively.
From equations (13) and (14), we derive the demand functions as follows:
Cmt =
w   
Pt(1 + )
; (15)
6) In the context of trade and development, the Stone-Geary utility function is often used: Matsuyama (1992),
Spilimbergo (2000), Kikuchi (2004), and Azarnert (2014).
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Cat =
w + 
1 + 
: (16)
For Cmt to be positive, we assume that w > .
Substituting equations (15) and (16) into equation (12), we obtain the indirect utility
function at t, u˜t as follows.
u˜t = J + (1 + ) ln(wt   )   ln Pt; (17)
where J   ln   (1+ ) ln(1+ ) is constant. A decrease in the relative price increases the
real income, and hence, improves the indirect utility.
2.3 Autarky
Consider the equilibrium under autarky. The market clearing conditions are given by
Cat = (1   )Xat; (18)
Cmt = (1   )Xmt: (19)
Hence, from equations (18) and (19), employment in each sector is given by
LA =
"
(1   )A + 
A(1 + )
#
; (20)
Lm =
"
(1   )A   
A(1 + )
#
; (21)
Lg = : (22)
From equation (21), for Lm to be positive, we need  > (A   )=A. From equations (20) and
(21), an increase in  decreases the number of workers in the agricultural and manufacturing
sectors.7)
Using equations (3), (4), (21), and (22), we obtain the growth rate of the manufacturing
productivity under autarky as follows:
M˙t
Mt
= LgLm =
[(1   )A   ]
A(1 + )
> 0: (23)
Note that we have already imposed the condition (1   )A    > 0.
7) Partially dierentiating equations (20) and (21) with respect to , we obtain @LA=@ =  =(1 + ) < 0 and
@Lm=@ =  1=(1 + ) < 0.
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Using equations (10), (11), and (17), we obtain the indirect utility function under autarky
u˜ct is as follows:
u˜ct = J + (1 + ) ln[(1   )A   )]   ln A + lnMt: (24)
Equation (24) shows that an increase in the agricultural productivity increases the indirect
utility under autarky.
Finally, we obtain the total welfare under autarky during [0;1) from equation (24).
Wc =
Z 1
0
u˜ct e
 t dt: (25)
3 Small open economy
In this section, we consider the case of a small open economy. Namely, the small home
country trades with the large rest of the world (ROW, hereafter). The ROW’s variables
are distinguished from the Home’s variables by adding an asterisk “.” The Home takes the
world price P as given. The structure of the ROW is the same as that of the Home except that
the ROW does not provide infrastructures. Here, an increase in the ROW’s manufacturing
productivity Mt , is given by M˙

t = 
Xmt, where 
 > 0 and its growth rate is given by
M˙t
Mt
=
(A   )
A(1 + )
: (26)
In addition, we assume that the Home (the ROW) has a comparative advantage in agri-
culture (manufacturing) at the initial time.
Assumption 1. The following inequality holds:
M0
A
>
M0
A
: (27)
Hence, if the Home begins trading at the initial time, it specializes in agriculture accord-
ing to the law of comparative advantage.
However, the manufacturing productivities of the Home and the ROW evolve through
time, and hence, the initial comparative advantage pattern can change through time. There
are three possible specialization patterns in t 2 (0;1): (a) if Mt =A > Mt=A, the Home
specializes in agriculture; (b) if Mt =A
 < Mt=A, the Home specializes in manufacturing; and
(c) if Mt =A
 = Mt=A, the Home incompletely specializes, that is, produces both goods.
Moreover, we assume the following rule with regard to industrialization.
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Assumption 2. If the Home’s government intends to industrialize, then it chooses to close
the economy until it has a comparative advantage in manufacturing.8)
We define t1 as the time when the Home has a comparative advantage in the manufac-
turing sector. Therefore, the Home begins to open the economy at t1. We now consider the
following two cases. In the first case, we consider a situation in which the Home specializes
in the agricultural sector during t 2 [0;1). In this case, the Home’s government does not
impose tax, that is,  = 0. In the second case, we consider a situation in which the Home
continues to be under autarky during t 2 [0; t1] and engages in trade with the ROW during
t 2 (t1;1).
3.1 Specialization in the agricultural sector
We consider the case in which the Home specializes in agriculture: the Home continues to
specialize in the agricultural sector during t 2 [0;1). Hence, from the profit maximization
condition, we obtain
1 =
wt
A
() wt = A: (28)
From equation (28) and Pt = A
=Mt , we obtain the indirect utility function at t, u˜
f
at, as
follows:
u˜ fat = J + (1 + ) ln(A   )   ln A + lnMt : (29)
Note that the ROW’s growth rate of manufacturing productivity M˙t =M

t is positive, and
hence, u˜ fat continues to increase. From equation (29), the total welfare of the Home under
specialization in agriculture, W fa , is given by
W fa =
Z 1
0
u˜ fate
 t dt: (30)
3.2 Industrialization
We consider the case in which the Home’s government decides to industrialize. For this
policy to be feasible, the Home must have a comparative advantage in the manufacturing
8) Note that if, at t = 0, the Home chooses to continue to be under autarky through time, the instantaneous
utility under autarky will be larger than that under specialization in agriculture at some point in time. Ac-
cordingly, the total welfare under autarky can be larger than that under specialization in agriculture depending
on the discount rate. However, if the Home’s government chooses to adopt the industrialization rule, the total
welfare under the rule necessarily exceeds that under autarky. For this issue, see Figure 4 that will be explained
later.
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sector at t1 2 (0;1). Hence, the condition for industrialization is given by
Mt
A
 M

t
A
for any t such that t1  t (31)
Accordingly, the condition Mt1=A
 = Mt1=A gives the timing of opening trade. Therefore, t1
is given by
t1 =
(lnM0   lnM0)   (ln A   ln A)
[(1   )A   ]
A(1 + )
  
(A   )
A(1 + )
: (32)
The numerator of equation (32) is positive because equation (27) holds. Next, the denomi-
nator of equation (32) shows the dierence between the growth rate of manufacturing pro-
ductivity of the Home under autarky and the growth rate of manufacturing productivity of
the ROW. Unless this dierence is positive, then the Home cannot industrialize. Hence, the
Home cannot have a dynamic comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector through
time: there is no timing of opening trade. In contrast, if the denominator of equation (32) is
positive, then there is t1 2 (0;1). Accordingly, we obtain the following lemma with regard
to the tax rate.
Lemma 1. For the Home to have a comparative advantage in manufacturing at time t1, the
the Home’s government must impose the tax rate that satisfies the following inequality:
(A   )  
q
(A   )2   4A2(A )
A
2A
<  <
(A   ) +
q
(A   )2   4A2(A )
A
2A
: (33)
Proof. For t1 to be positive, the denominator of the right-hand side of equation (32) must be
positive. Note that the denominator is a quadratic function of . Accordingly, solving the
condition that the denominator is positive, we obtain Lemma 1. 
When the Home specializes in manufacturing, the employment share of the manufactur-
ing sector and that of the public sector are respectively given by
Lm = 1   ; (34)
Lg = : (35)
Hence, the growth rate of the manufacturing productivity leads to
M˙t
Mt
= LgLm = (1   ); for t 2 [t1;1): (36)
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From the above analysis, the Home’s manufacturing productivities during t 2 [0; t1] and
during t 2 [t1;1) are respectively given by
Mt =
8>>>><>>>>:
M0 exp
"
[(1   )A   ]
A(1 + )
 t
#
; for t 2 [0; t1];
Mt1 exp

(1   )  (t   t1) ; for t 2 [t1;1); (37)
where Mt1  M0 exp
"
[(1   )A   ]
A(1 + )
 t1
#
:
[Figure 1 around here]
Figure 1 shows the time paths of the logarithms of the relative productivities of the
Home and the ROW. The Home continues to be under autarky until t1, and then, it continues
to engage in free trade: from t1, the Home specializes in the manufacturing sector.
We investigate the relationship between the tax rate and the timing of opening trade.
From equation (32), we obtain
dt1
d
= 0 ()  = A   
2A
> 0: (38)
Hence, we obtain the following proposition:
Proposition 1. There is the tax rate minimizing the autarkic period t 2 [0; t1].
Proof. The denominator of the right-hand side of equation (32) is a quadratic function of 
that is convex upward. Then, t1 is minimized when the denominator is maximized. Solving
dt1=d = 0, we obtain Proposition 1. 
Equation (32) is clearly a decreasing function of , and hence, we obtain the following
proposition.
Proposition 2. As the eciency parameter of the public sector  gets larger, the timing of
opening trade t1 gets faster.
We explain the intuition of Proposition 2. If the eciency of the public sector increases,
the growth rate of the Home’s manufacturing productivity increases. Hence, an increase in
 accelerates the timing of opening trade.
Furthermore, we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 3. The eect of an increase in agricultural productivity on the timing of opening
trade is ambiguous.
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Proof. Dierentiating t1 with respect to A, we obtain the following expression:
dt1
dA
=
ICA eectz}|{


A
 
LRA eectz                          }|                          {
ln
 
A
M0
 M

0
A
!
 
A2(1 + )

2
; where 
  [(1   )A   ]
A(1 + )
  
(A   )
A(1 + )
> 0:
(39)

Note that the term ln[(A=M0)  (M0=A)] is positive because of Assumption 1. The eect
of an increase in the agricultural productivity on the timing of opening trade is decomposed
into two eects. The first term of the numerator on the right-hand side shows the “initial
comparative advantage eect” (ICA eect) while the second term of the numerator shows
the “labor reallocation eect” (LRA eect). The initial comparative advantage eect means
that an increase in A increases the degree of the Home’s initial comparative advantage in
agriculture, and consequently, makes it more dicult to have a comparative advantage in
manufacturing. Accordingly, the initial comparative advantage eect delays the timing of
opening trade. The labor reallocation eect means that an increase in A releases labor from
the agricultural sector to manufacturing sector, and consequently, intensifies learning by
doing in manufacturing from equation (3), thereby increasing the manufacturing productiv-
ity Mt. Accordingly, the labor reallocation eect accelerates the timing of opening trade.
Therefore, if the labor reallocation eect dominates the initial comparative advantage eect,
then an increase in the agricultural productivity accelerates the timing of opening trade. In
contrast, if the initial comparative advantage eect dominates the labor reallocation eect,
then an increase in the agricultural productivity delays the timing of opening trade.
Moreover, if  = 0, an increase in the agricultural productivity delays the timing of
opening trade from equation (39) because the labor reallocation eect vanishes.
Lemma 2. If  = 0, an increase in the agricultural productivity necessarily delays the
timing of opening trade.
Lemma 2 is similar to a result of Redding (1999). Therefore, Proposition 2 generalizes
the result of Redding (1999). Our result depends on the non-homotheticity of preference,
that is,  > 0. Note that Matsuyama (1992) and Chang et al. (2006) use the Stone-Geary
utility function but do not discuss the timing of opening trade.
[Figures 2 and 3 around here]
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Figures 2 and 3 numerically reveals the relationship between the eect of an increase
in the agricultural productivity and the timing of opening trade.9) If  = 0:1, an increase
in the agricultural productivity from A = 1 to A = 1:5 almost delays the opening time: the
initial comparative advantage eect is larger than the labor reallocation eect. However, if
 = 0:4, an increase in the agricultural productivity accelerates and delays the timing of
opening trade depending on the size of the tax rate: the initial comparative advantage eect
is smaller than the labor reallocation eect.
The relative world price of manufactured goods determines wt. When the Home special-
izes in the manufacturing sector, the profit maximization condition gives
Pt =
wt
(1   )Mt : (40)
Since Pt = A
=Mt under free trade, from equation (40), we obtain
wt =
(1   )AMt
Mt
: (41)
Substituting equation (41) and Pt = A
=Mt into equation (17), we obtain the instantaneous
indirect utility function for t > t1 as follows:
for t 2 [t1;1) u˜ fmt = J + (1 + ) ln
"
(1   )AMt
Mt
  
#
  ln A + lnMt : (42)
We explain the intuition of equation (42). The eect of Mt is decomposed into the follow-
ing two opposing eects. An increase in Mt lowers the relative world price of manufactured
goods, and hence, the Home’s instantaneous utility improves. In contrast, an increase in
Mt reduces the Home’s comparative advantage in the manufacturing sector, and hence, the
Home’s instantaneous utility declines. In addition, we know that an increase in the agricul-
tural productivity does not aect the Home’s instantaneous utility during t 2 (t1;1).
The Home’s welfare during [t1;1),W fm, is given by
W fm =
Z 1
t1
u˜ fmte
 t dt: (43)
Hence, the Home’s total welfare through time, Wm, is given by
Wm = Wc +W fm =
Z t1
0
u˜ct e
 t dt +
Z 1
t1
u˜ fmte
 t dt: (44)
9) The parameters are set as follows: A = 1, A = 1, M0 = 0:5, M0 = 1,  = 1, and 
 = 0:05.
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4 Welfare analysis
4.1 Welfare
In this section, we compareW fa andWm. Figure 4 shows the time paths of the instantaneous
utility. In the case of industrialization, the Home specializes in the manufacturing sector at
t1. Note that the Home’s instantaneous utility under specialization in manufacturing during
t 2 [t1; t2] is smaller than that under specialization in agriculture during t 2 [t1; t2]. However,
from t2 on, the growth rate of u˜
f
mt is larger than that of u˜
f
at, and accordingly, the level of u˜
f
mt
becomes larger than that of u˜ fat. Hence, depending on the size of the discount rate ,Wm can
be larger than W fa .
Proposition 4. The total welfare under industrialization can be larger than the total welfare
under specialization in agriculture depending on the size of the discount rate.
[Figure 4 around here]
4.2 Optimal tax rate
In this section, we examine the existence of the optimal tax rate maximizing Wm. However,
the computation of equation (44) and the partial derivative of the resultant expression with
respect to , @Wm=@, are very complicated, and accordingly, we use numerical simulations.
The reason for the existence of the optimal tax rate will be explained below.
Figures 5 and 6 show the existences of the optimal tax rates in the cases of  = 0:1 and
 = 0:4, respectively.
[Figures 5 and 6 around here]
In addition, Figure 5 shows that an increase in the agricultural productivity can reduce the
total welfare, and Figure 6 shows that an increase in the agricultural productivity improves
the total welfare. The reason for this is as follows. From equation (17), an increase in the
agricultural productivity directly increases instantaneous utility under autarky u˜ct :
@u˜ct
@A
=
A(1   ) + 
A[(1   )A   ] > 0: (45)
We call this the direct eect of agricultural productivity growth. In addition, as stated above,
an increase in the agricultural productivity has the two eects on the timing of opening trade:
the initial comparative advantage eect and the labor reallocation eect. The initial com-
parative advantage eect decreases the total welfare because an increase in the agricultural
14
productivity directly delays the timing of opening trade. In contrast, the labor reallocation
eect shows that an increase in the agricultural productivity reallocates labor from the agri-
cultural sector to the manufacturing and public sectors, thereby improving the total welfare.
Therefore, in Figure 5, the negative initial comparative advantage eect dominates the
positive direct eect and the positive labor reallocation eect while in Figure 6, the positive
direct eect and the positive labor reallocation eect dominate the negative initial compara-
tive advantage eect.10)
Proposition 5. There is the optimal tax rate that maximizes the total welfare under indus-
trialization.
Proposition 6. An increase in the agricultural productivity increases or decreases the total
welfare under industrialization depending on the size of the subsistence level of agricultural
consumption.
In our model, the reason why instantaneous utility continues to increase through time is
that the manufacturing productivity continues to increase through time. Note that the growth
rate of the manufacturing productivity is a quadratic function convex upward with respect to
the tax rate both before and after industrialization. Accordingly, both too high and low tax
rates decrease the growth rate of the manufacturing productivity. That is, roughly speaking,
a tax rate that maximizes the growth rate of the manufacturing productivity corresponds to
a tax rate that maximizes the total welfare through time.
Note that a tax rate that maximizes the growth rate of the manufacturing productivity
under autarky, a, is given by11)
a =
A   
2A
; (46)
which is exactly the same as equation (38), and a tax rate that maximizes the growth rate of
the manufacturing productivity under specialization in manufacturing, m, is given by12)
m =
1
2
: (47)
From equations (46) and (47), we find that productivity growth maximizing tax rates do not
depend on the discount rate . In contrast, from equation (44), we find that the optimal
tax rate that maximizes the total welfare depends on the discount rate. Hence, the welfare
maximizing tax rate is not equal to a productivity growth maximizing tax rate.
10) Moreover, the labor reallocation eect does not exist in the case of  = 0. Then, in this case, an increase
in the agricultural productivity always reduces the total welfare.
11) Dierentiating equation (23) with respect to  gives equation (46).
12) Dierentiating equation (36) with respect to  gives equation (47).
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Next, we investigate the relationship between the total welfare and timing of opening
trade. From Figures 2, 3, 5, and 6, we know that the optimal tax rate maximizing Wm is dif-
ferent from the tax rate minimizing the timing of opening trade. The reason is that providing
infrastructures sacrifices consumption, which contributes to lowering the total welfare. In
addition, the loss of consumption under autarky is larger than that under specialization in
the manufacturing sector. If the discount rate is large, the loss under autarky is also large,
and hence, the optimal tax rate is smaller than the tax rate minimizing the timing of opening
trade.
Lemma 3. There is the optimal timing of opening trade that maximizes the total welfare and
this timing is obtained from the optimal tax rate.
Wong and Yip (2010) also construct a dynamic Ricardian trade model and show that
by intentionally delaying the timing of opening trade, an economy succeeds in industrial-
ization. They argue dynamic comparative advantage though they do not refer to Redding
(1999). They assume that under autarky, the government subsidizes the manufacturing to
promote industrialization. On the one hand, this policy attracts workers from agriculture
to manufacturing, which intensifies learning by doing in the manufacturing sector, leading
to strengthening the potential comparative advantage in manufacturing. On the other hand,
after opening trade (i.e., industrialization), all workers are employed in the manufacturing
sector, and hence, the optimal policy is not to subsidize.
In contrast, in our model, under both autarky and industrialization, when the tax rate is
zero, the employment of the public sector is zero, and hence, the growth rate of the man-
ufacturing sector is zero. Then, the government must impose a positive tax rate to sustain
specialization in manufacturing after industrialization. To sum up, in Wong and Yip (2010),
there is no government policy after industrialization whereas in our model there is govern-
ment policy after industrialization.
5 Conclusion
We have constructed a dynamic Ricardian trade model that incorporates public provision
of infrastructures. We have shown that an increase in the agricultural productivity plays an
important role for industrialization. The results are summarized as follows.
First, there is the optimal tax rate maximizing the total welfare. Second, if the level of
basic consumption is positive, an increase in the agricultural productivity can accelerate the
timing of opening trade. Third, if the level of basic consumption is zero, an increase in the
agricultural productivity delays the timing of opening trade and decreases the total welfare.
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Fourth, an increase in the eciency of public provision of infrastructures accelerates the
timing of opening trade. This result does not depend on the existence of the basic consump-
tion. Fifth, at the timing of opening trade, the instantaneous utility under industrialization is
lower than that under specialization in agriculture. However, the growth rate of the instan-
taneous utility under industrialization is larger than that under specialization in agriculture.
Therefore, depending the size of the discount rate, the total welfare under industrialization
can be larger than that under specialization in agriculture.
Is agricultural productivity growth good for industrialization? The eect of an increase
in the agricultural productivity on the total welfare depends on the size of the subsistence
level of consumption for agricultural goods. A large subsistence level means that the income
elasticity of consumption for manufactured goods is high. In addition, according to our re-
sults, when the subsistence level is large, an increase in the agricultural productivity raises
the total welfare. Therefore, we can say that if an economy produces high quality, sophis-
ticated manufactured goods, agricultural productivity growth is good for industrialization,
whereas if an economy produces low quality, less-sophisticated manufactured goods, agri-
cultural productivity growth is not good for industrialization.
Some extensions will be left for future research.
To begin with, we can introduce capital accumulation. In our model, labor is the only
factor of production in both agriculture and manufacturing. However, manufactured goods
are more capital intensive than agricultural goods. Accordingly, the introduction of capital
accumulation will be interesting.
Next, we can modify the tax rule. In our model, the tax rule is constant through time,
that is, the government imposes a constant, same tax rate during both autarky and industri-
alization. However, as a more general tax rule, it is possible that the government imposes
dierent tax rates during autarky and industrialization.
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Figure 1: Time paths of relative productivities
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
O
p
e
n
i
n
g
t
i
m
e
Tax rate
 = 0:1
A = 1
A = 1:5
Figure 2: Relationship between agricultural productivity and timing of opening trade when
 = 0:1
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Figure 3: Relationship between agricultural productivity and timing of opening trade when
 = 0:4
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Figure 4: Time paths of instantaneous utilities
21
300
350
400
450
500
550
600
650
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
W
e
l
f
a
r
e
Tax rate
 = 0:1
A = 1
A = 1:5
Figure 5: Optimal tax rate, welfare, and agricultural productivity when  = 0:1
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Figure 6: Optimal tax rate, welfare, and agricultural productivity when  = 0:4
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